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Perspective: Technology Transfer
and Human Rights: Joining Up the Dots
by Stephen Humphreys*
“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and
its applications.”—International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Art. 15(1)(b)

T

he transfer of technology is one of the core mechanisms
at the heart of the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”) and a key vehicle for channeling
the “equity” demands in that treaty. The UNFCCC recognizes (i)
that in order to adapt to climate change and continue to develop
sustainably, poor countries will need technological assistance,
and (ii) that there is an obligation on richer countries—as their
contribution to the cause of climate change is greater and they
also have greater technological capacity—to provide that assistance. The treaty further makes developing country participation
in the climate regime dependent upon “effective” technology
transfer from industrial countries. Yet so far, for a variety of reasons, structured technology transfer has not taken place. Despite
its centrality, and despite enormous attention in UN negotiating
rooms over the years, the subject is infected by obscurity and
jargon, it has received little public airing and often seems marginalized or disconnected from other, better known areas of the
climate debate. There is no inherent reason that this should be
the case, in particular given the central importance of technology transfers to surmounting climate change equitably. It is in
that light that many of the articles in this issue of Sustainable
Development Law & Policy focus on the global transfer of clean
technologies and the mechanisms that strive to enable that trade.
However, there is yet another important dimension of both technology transfer and the climate debate: the human perspective.

The Human Rights Dimensions of
Technology Transfer
Since the Bali Conference of the Parties in 2007, it has been
clear that technology transfer will remain critical to any global
deal on climate change, and so there is no room for continuing
political deadlock. The resulting impetus has engendered new
angles on climate-related technologies, among them increased
attention to the human dimensions—sometimes articulated as
the human rights implications—of this and other areas of climate change activity. More than most topics in the climate
change arena, actions and decisions on technology transfer will
have significant and specific human rights implications. These
are of two main kinds, one immediate, the second longer term.
First, technological solutions will be required to ensure
that the expected human rights consequences of climate change
impacts are avoided or minimized. In short, technological
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solutions are necessary for adaptation, especially where climate
change threatens basic subsistence—health, food, water, and
shelter, for example, all of which are recognized rights under
international law. Expected threats include droughts, water salination and sea-level rise; livelihoods will be at risk as crops, fisheries, livestock, and even land will deplete or vanish. In order to
head off the most dire consequences of these outcomes—forced
mass migration and conflict—solutions will need to be found and
mobilized quickly. In every case, such solutions will rely in part
on the availability of appropriate technologies to meet the new
conditions of life under a changed climate. These include water
treatment technologies for desalination and irrigation, for example, or agricultural solutions to adapt to changing or reduced crop
cycles. Protection from hotter temperatures through building
materials or techniques, from higher sea-levels through protective walls or other measures, and from increased vector diseases,
like malaria, through increased access to quality medicines and
healthcare systems to distribute cures and provide care.
However, investment in these technologies is beyond the
resources of many of the countries that will be worst hit. Finding
a means to make them available at low or no cost is therefore
critical to climate change adaptation if appalling human rights
consequences are to be avoided. Bringing a human rights analytic to bear on the expected impacts of climate change can help
direct attention to where the worst harms are foreseeable, which
in turn can orient responses towards the most useful and urgent
solutions. Since these solutions will involve—and are likely to
some extent to hinge upon—technological know-how, a human
rights angle can usefully be fed early on into both technology
development and technology delivery agendas. Where these
agendas are not yet being set in the climate change debate, attention to the human rights consequence will concentrate minds.
Where agendas are being drawn up, looking ahead to human
rights needs can provide useful orientation. In both cases, a
human rights lens may lead policymakers to recognize the need
for an intensive, coordinated, technically, and, in some cases,
legally creative response to climate change in keeping with the
requirements of the UNFCCC.
Second, long term development, upon which the protection
of human rights ultimately depends, will come under immense
stress due to climate change mitigation policies. For developed
and developing countries alike—but especially for the latter
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where, in many cases, basic human rights still remain unfulfilled—further development will increasingly rely upon access
to efficient, clean, and renewable technologies. Indeed, it will in
many cases require restructuring of entire economies. Securing
human rights over the long term in the face of climate change
requires the transfer of technologies for energy generation and
distribution and for adequate transport, among other things.
This is not a controversial demand, but once again little
attention has been directed to the human rights consequences
that will result from a failure to plan well in advance. For example, if technology transfer is slow or not forthcoming, individuals in many countries will inevitably be reliant on carbon-based
energy supplies for their immediate developmental needs. A
human rights sensitive approach to technology will be attentive
to the possibility that access to carbon-intensive technologies
may be more, rather than less, needed in some poorer countries, at least in the mid-term. The long-term fulfillment of basic
human rights—to food, water, property, health, and shelter, and
even culture and livelihoods—will depend, in many countries,
on a measured, structured, and informed conversion from carbon
to clean fuels. Awareness of these realities provides an appropriate basis for testing and fleshing out promises of future technological progress—which currently remain vague—against hard
needs that already exist and will only worsen over time.
In each of the above areas, a human rights optic can bring
essential nuance to policy. It can help ensure equitable access
to new technologies in recipient countries through sensitivity
to the possibility of inequalities of access and participation that
mutually reinforce privilege and vulnerability. And it can help
determine which of a possible range of technological solutions
to choose in a given context, by focusing on the core necessity to
maintain basic threshold levels of rights fulfillment for the greatest number over costly experimentation that may suit only a few.

Fragmentation of International Law?
Among the many obstacles cited for the delay in implementing effective technology transfer, intellectual property rights are
often assumed to be the primary problem. International protection
of intellectual property is thought to pose an initial hurdle to governments attempting to make transfer effective using public policy
tools. Treaty agreements, notably (but not only) the WTO-governed Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (“TRIPS”) ensure that the protections of private ownership
in a given technology are adequately reflected in the price of that
technology. Although TRIPS does not appear to be relevant to all
or even most of the technologies needed for climate change adaptation, this complaint deserves attention if only because it has had
a chilling effect on technology transfer negotiations.
TRIPS is not the only international legal instrument relevant to climate change or to technology transfer. Climate change
technology transfer takes place within the context of a broad
web of relevant treaty laws and customary practices, and is relevant to an unusually wide range of areas of science, law, and
policy. In addition to intellectual property law, other areas of
the international trade regime are clearly relevant, including the
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safeguards of private property rights (the rights of investors or
technological proprietors) found in free trade agreements and
in Bilateral Investment Treaties. The latter frequently include
clauses specifically prohibiting host governments from actions
to further technology transfer. Where these treaties also include
“most favored nation” provisions, as most do, an international
regime effectively takes shape universalizing this prohibition.
To these must also be added international human rights law,
which is presumptively relevant whenever policy options have
human rights implications. Here, the principal instrument is
likely to be the International Covenant on Social, Economic and
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”). The 159 states that are party to the
ICESCR have undertaken to “progressively realize” the social
and economic rights (such as to food, water, health, education,
and housing) of those within their territories. Under conditions
of climate change, states’ obligations towards their own populations in these areas are arguably reinforced at the international
level, where arrangements between states effectively facilitate or
impede the capacity to fulfil these rights. In this regard, a rarely
cited provision of the ICESCR acquires renewed importance in
the context of climate change. ICESCR Article 15(1)(b) guarantees “the right of everyone . . . to enjoy the benefits of scientific
progress and its applications.”
To conclude, technology transfer is a necessary and central
plank of any global climate change solution, but it often appears
stuck in jargon and entrenched positions engendered over years of
difficult negotiations. So ironically, whereas everyone acknowledges the critical importance of technology transfer, progress
has been slow or absent, and the subject has become unwieldy.
Approaching it from a human rights perspective may help overcome the impasse, by allowing all parties to refocus on basic
human imperatives and to set historical and ideological differences aside in the interests of dealing pragmatically with questions
of real urgency. Locating human rights entry points and priorities
can reorient the debate: what technologies are needed where and
how urgently? Useful future research agendas may include:
• Predicting human rights threats in specific localities;
• Assessing the best and most efficient technology solutions
already in existence to meet them;
• Framing technological research agendas for clean and efficient solutions for the most pressing urgencies;
• Assessing existing channels and barriers for international
cooperation;
• Seeking policy solutions for an international regulatory
framework;
• Assessing likely blockages and solutions at the national
level; and ultimately,
• What sort of research and policy framework is needed to
ensure that the right technologies reach the right communities in the most timely manner in order to prevent human
rights harms?
These are among the urgent human rights questions faced
by climate change negotiators as they seek any technology-based
solution for the future and will continue to be extremely relevant
to any discussion of clean technology transfer.
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